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This paper is the third in the LSEE Papers series which, following two 
previous insightful papers on cultural and political developments in South 
Eastern Europe, addresses a topic of central importance to the region’s 
economic development. The focus of Nevenka Čučković’s paper is the 
privatisation of state-owned utility companies in Croatia in the telecoms 
and oil & gas industries. While the focus of the paper is on experience in 
Croatia, the argument presented also has a wider relevance for those 
countries in the region which are pursuing a similar privatisation of public 
utilities. The paper is the result of a research project carried out by the 
research team from the Institute for International Relations in Zagreb who 
were the winners of a competitive call for research project proposals 
issued in October 2009 within the wider LSEE Research Programme on 
South Eastern Europe, supported by the John S. Latsis Public Benefit 
Foundation. 
 
LSEE Papers are intended to provide a series of provocative and timely 
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on the significant issues of the day pertaining to an ever-important region 
of Europe. 
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Introduction 
In the last twenty years, many mature western market economies, as well 
as post-socialist countries, have pursued the privatisation of enterprises in 
the public utilities sectors (such as telecommunications, electricity, the oil 
and gas industry, water supply, railroads and railways) that were 
traditionally in state ownership and whose services had been provided by 
the state for many decades. Croatia has also followed that path, but with a 
considerable time-lag. A greater reliance on private enterprises in the 
provision of these services has brought some economic and social gains 
(improving efficiency, upgrading technology and innovation as well as an 
improved quality of services). However, this has been accompanied by 
some social repercussions (laying-off redundant employees, and 
increasing the prices of some subsidised services). The cost-benefit 
balance sheet seems uneven and differs across various categories of 
beneficiaries (consumers, employees, the state, private owners and 
shareholders). Apart from ownership transformation, the 
professionalisation of management was also a key consideration for 
improving their business performance and corporate governance, 
although this was often held back by entrenched interests and by direct 
political interference. 
The privatisation of public utilities has been the most controversial 
component of the privatisation process because such enterprises were 
often natural monopolies which provided universal services. Also, public 
enterprises in these sectors were usually the most valuable parts of the 
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state portfolio. The privatisation of these sectors was thus often seen as 
“selling the family silver”, and government s have usually taken this 
decision only when they were driven to by EU accession conditionality or 
by desperate needs for additional budget revenues.  
The aim of the research on which this paper is based was to investigate, 
and where possible measure, the effects of policies of marketization and 
privatisation of the telecommunication and the oil and gas industries in 
Croatia with respect to their business efficiency, employment levels, 
investment, service quality, diversity and prices. The paper questions 
whether the expected improvements in business performance actually 
occurred in the post-privatisation period and whether they improved 
consumer welfare. Both specialists and the wider public have opposing 
views about the changes which took place, and the paper therefore 
attempts to set out a considered analysis of the actual effects of the 
privatisation of these two public utilities in Croatia. 
The paper provides both a quantitative and qualitative assessment of the 
privatisation impacts on business performance in the telecommunications 
and oil and gas industry, and provides a balance sheet of accomplishments 
in the post-privatisation period.  The assessment is also based on a range 
of qualitative indicators from two case studies of privatised companies in 
Croatia.  The field research was based on in-depth interviews with 
members of the executive and supervisory boards at Croatian Telecom 
(HT) and the Croatian oil and gas company INA, professionals working in 
the regulatory agencies in these two sectors, and major stakeholders such 
as trade unions, consumer and employer associations, and government 
and academic experts. 
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Some conceptual foundations 
The conceptual framework for the analysis is drawn from the fields of new 
public management, public choice theory, agency theory and transaction 
cost economics. In the last two decades the concepts of privatisation, 
restructuring, regulation, and competition in the public utilities sectors 
have been used to analyse both western and post-socialist reform 
packages (Vickers and Yarrow, 1991). The controversy has not been 
resolved despite a plethora of empirical evidence. The answers are still 
tentative and their categorisation into well founded “pro” and “contra” 
arguments depends very much on the specific case or sector or 
institutional framework underpinning the privatisation. Namely, many 
debates on the effects of privatisation have not been convincingly 
concluded and need more research. Some empirical studies have found 
evidence of the improved efficiency of privatised firms in the public 
utilities sector, while other empirical studies are less convincing. The so-
called “New Public Management” theories (Hood 1995) have introduced a 
wider view of the problem and have linked the performance of such 
enterprises with general public management and economic governance 
problems. This paper contextualises its results within a growing literature 
which assesses the empirical evidence on both private and public 
ownership options and management concepts1. It also identifies examples 
of good practice relevant for the SEE region where improving services and 
efficiency of public utilities is still an unfinished reform agenda that affects 
general economic performance. 
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Why privatise public utilities? 
In the last two and a half decades, the public utilities that have 
traditionally been in state ownership have undergone a tremendous scope 
of privatisation in many countries throughout the world2. These sectors 
provide various essential public goods and services to households and 
firms and supply them with necessities, such as water, electricity, natural 
gas, telephone and internet communications (Nestor and Mahboobi, 
1999). Often these products and services are provided by vertically 
integrated companies which include production, transmission and 
distribution and which hold a monopolistic position on the market.The aim 
of privatisation has usually been to improve their economic performance, 
and to change the incentives that influence their management, while 
keeping in mind that the provision of essential public goods is one of 
prime objectives of their operation. Public utilities have huge significance 
for national economies in terms of their contribution to the GDP, 
investment, employment, and budget revenues. Most significantly, their 
performance greatly affects the input costs of all other industries and 
economic sectors, as well as the general wellbeing of the population.  
Why privatise public utilities at all? Is a change of ownership of these 
enterprises, which are often natural monopolies, really necessary? Or, 
could improvements of their business performance be simply 
accomplished by introducing greater competition and better 
management?  Typically, there have been two main motivations for selling 
public utilities.  Firstly, additional revenue from privatisation is often badly 
needed for the state budget, and secondly there is often a desire to 
improve economic performance through stimulating incentives to 
restructure. The crucial economic motivation behind it has also been the 
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expectation that by improving the efficiency of these companies a 
significant cascading impact would be achieved by lowering input costs 
into production in other sectors, thus raising total factor productivity and 
economic growth throughout the whole economy. Empirical evidence in 
many countries has suggested that organisational restructuring of public 
enterprises and their privatisation, combined with the regulation of 
markets, have made network industries and utilities more efficient both in 
terms of business performance and quality of service delivery.3 Other 
arguments that have supported privatisation in these sectors over the last 
twenty years have been that private service providers who face 
competition have stronger incentives to control operational costs, to 
reduce prices of services in line with costs, to adopt new technologies, to 
innovate in business processes, and to adopt more efficient management 
practices. Although the most visible gains have been found in commercial 
utilities such as the telecom and oil industries, other infrastructure sectors 
have also made substantial improvements in corporate performance when 
faced with increased competition.  
A further motivation behind the privatisation of public utilities has been 
the expectation that it would be associated with price reform, and that 
competition among providers would initiate a much needed downward 
trend of prices and an improvement in the quality of services (Megginson, 
2005; OECD, 2009). Finally, it has also been expected to have a beneficial 
effect on income distribution due to wider accessibility and greater 
affordability of services to lower income households. However, these 
effects have been expected to vary considerably across countries 
depending on specific sectoral regulatory framework in place and the 
levels of household income (Wood, 2004). This paper examines if and to 
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what extent these expectations were met when privatising Croatian 
telecommunications and national oil and gas industry. 
 The ‘visible hands’ of the regulatory state 
While privatisation in other sectors has been based on a substantial 
process of liberalisation and deregulation designed to introduce 
contestable markets, the “visible hand” of the regulatory state was 
needed for sectors that were traditionally experiencing market failure. 
This has been particularly needed for sectors where competition is limited 
or absent (such as electricity, telecommunications, postal services, gas and 
water supply and similar) where regulation should support a desirable 
degree of competition. 
Significant institutional preconditions and safeguards should be met if 
privatisation is to achieve its public interest objectives (Kessides, 2004, 
Nestor, 2005). Two principles should be especially respected: (i) 
separation of the sectoral regulator and the competition agency and (ii) 
separation of the ownership function and the regulatory function of the 
state. Replacing a state monopoly with a private one would be neither 
economically nor socially very meaningful. The regulatory framework 
should aim to encourage competition and ensure equal opportunities for 
all market entrants, prevent and discourage monopolisation and ensure 
that the dominant player does not abuse its market position at the 
expense of consumers or other providers of the services. This does not 
relate only to the regulated sector, as cumulative non-competitive 
practices usually have negative spill-over effects in other sectors. 
Therefore, before privatising public enterprises, two separate but closely 
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related regulatory institutions should be established: (i) a competition 
agency (anti-trust agency) and (ii) an independent sectoral regulator who 
deals with the specifics of each public monopoly. 
The key benefits sought from independent regulators are to shield the 
enterprises from short-term political interventions in order to ensure long-
term market stability and avoid the influence of particular interests, 
whether by the entities being regulated or other groups. They are 
expected to ensure market discipline while protecting consumer interests, 
to facilitate open access to the core infrastructure and to preserve social 
objectives (OECD, 2003). However, creating regulatory institutions that are 
both legitimate to citizens and credible to investors has proven to be the 
greatest challenge of every case of public utilities privatisation (Kessides, 
2004).  
Only if these regulatory frameworks are in place can privatising natural 
monopolies be expected to raise economic and social welfare (Lopez de 
Silanes, 2005). As many experiences have shown, especially in developing 
countries (Saha and Parker, 2002), replacing public monopolies with 
private monopolies would be unlikely to improve social welfare or spread 
economic benefits to all sections of the population in the absence of 
effective regulation. On the contrary, consumers would most likely be 
exposed to monopolistic prices for essential services, with a consequent 
increase in poverty for lower-income groups.  
The separation of the ownership and regulatory functions of the state 
deserves special attention due to the potential “regulatory trap” which 
may arise if the regulative functions of the state are not carefully 
separated from its ownership interests (Kessides, 2004; OECD 2009).4The 
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problem is that regulation may have adverse effects if there are 
disincentives to regulate effectively in order to preserve the pre-
privatisation employment levels and position on the market5.  For that 
reason, it is of crucial importance that regulatory agencies are 
independent from entrenched political interests that could harm other 
market actors, leading to short term political gains but reducing the 
economic benefits from regulation, and increasing the costs for the 
economy as a whole (Vickers and Yarrow, 1989; Galal et al, 1994, Cook et 
al, 2003). An example of the Croatian energy regulatory agency (CERA) 
illustrates the case of a sectoral regulator that has until recently been 
heavily influenced by government decisions and political interests. The 
staffing of the regulators with influential members of the governing elite 
and political parties was a common feature of the early stages in the 
creation of sectoral regulators in Croatia.  
The Privatisation of the Telecommunication Sector: 
The Case of Croatian Telecom (HT) 
The privatisation of public utilities in Croatia started in 1999 with the 
adoption of the first privatisation acts related to Croatian 
Telecommunications (Hrvatske telekomunikacije)6. In order to prepare for 
privatisation, the company was incorporated in December 1998 pursuant 
to the provisions of the Act on the Separation of the Croatian Post and 
Croatian Telecommunications. The Parliament adopted the Croatian 
Telecom Privatisation Act (1999) allowing the sale of an initial 35% stake of 
the state company’s assets to a strategic foreign investor, believing that 
the most efficient market restructuring of the company could be done by a 
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reputable investor from the field. Also, it was estimated that such a 
transaction could generate the highest privatisation revenues for the 
national Budget. The winner of the initial privatisation tender was 
Deutsche Telecom which bought a 35% stake. Two years later, the 
Parliament adopted amendments to the Croatian Telecom Privatisation 
Act (2001) allowing the sale of a majority stake to the strategic foreign 
investor. The modifications enabled for selling an additional 16% of the 
shares in 2001, thus allowing Deutsche Telecom to gain majority stake 
(51%) of the company. This could be considered as a turning point with 
regard to ownership transformation which had a substantial effect on the 
corporate governance and business performance of the company in the 
post-privatisation period. It is worth mentioning that HT is still the only 
privatised public utility company in Croatia with dominant foreign 
ownership, in which the government has reduced its share to just 3.5%. 
Furthermore, at the end of 20107 the government gave up entirely its 
ownership stake and transferred its share to the Pensioners Fund (the 
first-pillar state-owned pension fund), thus exiting from any direct 
influence on the business activities of the company. The other companies 
that started the privatisation process in the public sector, such as the oil 
and gas company INA, did not manage to evolve towards majority private 
ownership for almost a decade following the sale of the initial minority 
equity stake.  
Ownership transformation stages of Croatian Telecom 
As elsewhere, the privatisation of Croatian Telecommunications (HT) was 
implemented in several stages, allowing the government the time to 
develop and regulate the competition framework for the sector. The five 
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major privatisation stages and modes of divestiture of state-owned HT 
shares took place as follows:  
1 The sale of 35% of the total shares to a strategic investor from 
Germany - Deutsche Telekom AG in October 1999.8 
2 The sale of an additional 16% of the remaining shares, allowing 
Deutsche Telecom to gain a majority stake (51%) in 20029. 
3 In 2007 the government sold 32.5% of the remaining shares 
through an Initial Public Offering10, of which 25% were reserved 
for Croatian citizens. The other 7.5% of shares was sold to 
institutional investors.  
4 Following the sale of a further tranche of shares to the present 
and former employees of Croatian Telecom and Croatian Post in 
June 2008, the government reduced its holding from 9.5% to 3.5%, 
while private and institutional investors increased their share to 
38.5%.   
5 In December 2010 the government decided to transfer its 3.5% 
ownership11 to the state-owned Pension Fund, thus exiting 
entirely from the ownership of the company12. 
The initial privatisation call for offers proceeded transparently through 
international tender and followed the procedures offset out in the 
Croatian Telecom Privatisation Act. Given the high value of the company 
and the bad public perception of many of the privatisation deals that had 
taken place in the 1990s, the  government was keen to manage the 
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process in a cautious and transparent manner. With its offer of $850 
million for the first 35% of equity capital, and given its reputation and 
expertise, Deutsche Telekom (DT) was considered the best choice of 
strategic investor13, which could offer high quality, technologically 
advanced services and further investment in infrastructure. Some of the 
interviewees argued that the government preference for Deutsche 
Telekom was made on the basis of intensive Croatian economic and trade 
links with Germany, and also due its political significance for Croatia. 
Other interesting offers such as one from the main competitor Telenor of 
Norway were rejected, within this set of preferences. However, DT held 
the largest share of the telecom industry in Europe and was the third 
largest telecom company world-wide. Croatian consumers were expected 
to benefit not only from the better quality and diversity of services but 
also from lower prices, especially in fixed and mobile telephony, as well as 
through improved internet access.  
After gaining the majority ownership of 51% by acquiring the further 16% 
of HT capital in 2002, DT established HT Mobile Ltd. as a separate legal 
entity. Mobile telephony was considered important for the company’s 
future development. With foreign management skills DT has attempted to 
build an internationally competitive company able to cope better in an 
international environment of fast growing and profitable 
telecommunication services. HT mobile merged back to HT-Hrvatske 
telekomunikacije in 2009. 
Apart from maximising the net proceeds badly needed for the Budget, the 
privatisation of HT also offered a good investment opportunity for 
domestic institutional investors, mainly the state and private pension 
funds, as well as to small shareholders through the offer of substantial 
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price discounts to former and present employees. Over 300,000 Croatian 
small shareholders bought shares in the initial public offering (IPO) in 
2007. By 2009, the number of small shareholders had decreased to around 
250,000,holding 24.2% of total shareholder capital, as many had sold their 
shares to cash the difference between the discounted offer price and the 
higher market price. Since 2008 this has been one of the most traded 
shares on the Zagreb Stock Exchange and has contributed significantly to 
the general volume of transactions. 
Selected indicators of HT post-privatisation 
business performance  
This analysis in this section investigates whether the change of ownership 
and management of HT accompanied by regulation has brought about the 
expected improvements in business performance, productivity, efficiency, 
management, quality of services, prices, and protection of customers from 
market abuse.  
Business performance 
According to the performance data for 2004-2009, the total revenues of 
HT remained almost unchanged, at around €1.1 billion p.a. (see Figure 1).  
This suggests that its market position did not substantially alter within that 
period despite increased competition, regulation and restructuring of the 
market and the diversification of services in the post-privatisation period. 
In short, HT managed to maintain significant market power in most of its 
services. 
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Figure 1. Croatian Telecom’s revenues, employment and productivity, 
2004-2009 
 
Source: HT Annual Reports 2004-2009 
However, a significant change in the structure of revenues occurred in 
2004-2009, with a strong decline in revenues from fixed telephony (-37%), 
an increase in revenues from mobile telephony (17%) and a very strong 
increase of revenues from internet services (184%) (see Figure 2). 
Additionally, in 2009, HT revenues in the mobile telephony segment 
decreased due to a decrease in real personal income in Croatia, the 
introduction of a “crisis personal income tax”, as well as a 6% tax on 
mobile telephony revenues introduced in August 2009. 
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Internet services have maintained their strong growth, with a value in 
2009 that was nearly four times greater than in 2004, especially in 
broadband and IPTV (cable television), fuelled by increasing demand for 
internet content and for diversity in TV services, in line with world-wide 
trends. While in 2006, Croatia significantly lagged behind the EU in 
broadband penetration, it has since rapidly caught up, also in IPTV 
services. 
Figure 2. HT revenues by type of services, 2004-2009 (€ mil) 
Source: HT annual reports 2004-2009 
The structure of the revenues of HT is mainly determined by the overall 
trends in the Croatian telecom markets, with stagnation in the number of 
users and a general fall in the use of fixed voice services, an increase in 
mobile services and a very intensive increase in internet usage. 
464
541
543
341
41
156
0
100
200
300
400
500
600
700
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
Mobile telephony
Fixed telephony
Internet
Wholesale services
Data and other
19 
Based on the number of subscribers according to the Central Bureau of 
Statistics and HT data, the overwhelmingly high market share of HT in 
fixed telephony and in internet services has only recently started to 
decrease slightly, while in mobile services, due to existence of two 
competitors, the share of HT is significantly lower and has been decreasing 
slowly for some time. 
The partial liberalisation of fixed telephony services occurred only 
recently. By 2008-2009 nine operators were active in fixed telephony and 
these competitors were rather successful as indicated by the increase of 
HT services to other telecom companies. 
Operator preselect facility which permits a consumer to decide in advance 
to use an operator other than the operator providing the access service is 
a significant feature of the market. Additionally, multiple 
telecommunications operators are allowed to use connections from the 
telephone exchange to the customer's premises, but further liberalization 
of an access service is still yet to come. Customers have responded 
actively to the new opportunities, as indicated by the increased use of 
“number portability” facility14, which allows a customer of a telecoms 
operator to change to an alternative operator while still retaining the 
same telephone number.  
Since 2002 HT has held ‘significant market power’ (SMP) status in the 
markets for fixed public voice services, leased lines, interconnection and in 
voice, sound, data, documents, images and other transmission in fixed 
telecommunications network. Since 2004 T-Mobile has been designated as 
an SMP operator in the interconnection market and in the market for 
public voice services in mobile telecommunications networks. According 
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to existing obligations, the prices for retail public voice service in the fixed 
network and leased lines are subject to ex-ante approval by the Agency, 
whereas other retail pricing is subject to ex-post review. 
The new Law on Electronic Communications has been in force since July 
1st, 2008, and in 2009 the Croatian Agency for Post and Electronic 
Communications (HAKOM) decided to decrease fixed and mobile 
interconnection charges by up to 20%. Therefore a further gradual 
decrease of the HT market share is likely to occur.  
Employment and labour productivity 
The improved post-privatisation business performance of HT in 2004-2009 
led to falling levels of employment. By decreasing the number of 
employees by 31% (from 8,862 to 6,116 employees) the company 
managed to improve labour productivity (revenues per employee) by 56%. 
In short, productivity gains were mainly achieved by a substantial 
reduction of labour. It is even more obvious when these figures are 
examined over the period 2000-2009 when the number of employees was 
cut by almost a half (54.5%). This dramatic drop in the number of 
employees was of course unpopular, and was often disputed and resisted 
by both the trade unions and the government However, the new 
management of HT dealt with this dissatisfaction with a generous 
severance pay plan, and by providing training and in-house assistance for 
job search for laid-off workers. In contrast, HT Mobile (a separate entity 
within the T-HT Group), increased the number of employees by 3% in 
2003-2009, but this did not alter the general downward trend in the 
number of employees in the company as a whole.  
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Interviews with the executive board members indicated that company 
attempted “to ease the situation with regard to the laying-off of workers, 
and to carry it out in a socially responsible and acceptable manner and so 
no major conflicts, strikes or similar trade union pressures have occurred in 
the process. The company introduced a severance package and a careful 
plan for assisting the redundant labour in finding new jobs outside 
company. ”  
The productivity of labour has been further increased through the 
education and training of the company’s human resources, and in the 
period 2004-2009 the education structure of the employees was 
significantly improved (HT Annual Report, 2009).  
However, despite of a substantial increase in labour productivity, it still 
lags behind the productivity level of selected benchmark companies from 
the EU new member states (NMS), surpassing only the leading Slovenian 
telecom operator (see Figure 3). 
Public sector telecommunications have typically been overstaffed, and a 
reduction in employment has been a widespread phenomenon in most EU 
new member states (NMS) and countries of South East Europe. 
Regrettably, the repositioning of such companies in the newly regulated 
and competitive national markets meant substantial labour shedding, 
imposing a significant social cost in the countries in question, including 
Croatia. 
The decrease in employment in HT has been more intensive than in the 
cases of Hungarian Telecom Group and Slovenian Telecom, while being 
less intensive than in the Slovakia, Bulgaria and Romania. 
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Figure 3.  Productivity in HT and selected companies from EU NMS  
 
Source: HT annual reports 2004-2009 
Profit rate, earnings and investments 
The business results of HT remained rather favourable, with the earnings 
ratio 15well above 40% and profit margin exceeding 30%. However, in the 
last two years, the results deteriorated due to impact of the world 
economic crisis, stringent competition and regulative and fiscal pressure. 
It is interesting to note that the investment rate actually increased 
between 2008-2009 – following a downward trend in 2004-2007 – 
reflecting increased competition in the market. 
The members of the executive board who were interviewed considered 
that the investment rate was exceptionally high (15-19%) from 2004-2009.  
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Other interviewees considered that Deutsche Telekom made a significant 
investment in infrastructure and other long-term capital assets. 
HT has been rather successful in increasing business efficiency measured 
by profit margins in the post-privatisation period when compared to 
similar companies in Central Europe (see Figures 4 and 5). HT also had a 
high profit margin (23.8%) and earnings margin (43.4%) only slightly 
behind Slovak Telecom (15% and 44.4% respectively). The DT itself was 
less successful with a net profit of only 0.6% of total revenues in 2009, and 
an earnings rate of 30.8%. The profitability of HT is rather high also when 
compared to other SEE telecom companies with only Macedonia Telekom 
showing more favourable results, while Romtelecom (Romania) has the 
weakest performance among the selected SEE countries. 
Figure 4.  Croatian Telecom (HT) - EBITDA, EBIT, profit before tax and 
investment (% of total revenues) 
 
Source: Croatian Telecom (HT) Annual Reports 2004-2009 
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Figure 5. Net profit rate of Croatian Telecom and selected SEE 
companies, 2004-2009  
 
Source: Annual Reports of the companies under review, 2004-2009 
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privatisation contract stipulated that the monopoly status of HT in fixed 
telephony would not expire until the end of 2004, five years after the 
initial privatisation deal was signed. Some of the experts interviewed at 
HAKOM considered that such a contract was rather too generous to DT 
and argued that the Contract enabled HT to perpetuate its dominant 
market status especially in fixed telephony, even to the present day as it 
still holds about 85% of Croatian market share. 
The situation is well described by the one of the interviewees:  
 “The privatisation contract granted a sort of five-year-long “regulatory 
holiday” for DT/HT on one side. On the other side, as a market player with 
accumulated experience and information from other regulated markets, 
this information asymmetry enabled the firm to use the potentials of 
unregulated markets to its maximum benefit. At the same time, the 
establishment of the independent regulator was slow, it was understaffed 
and lacked experts with a knowledge on such a complex regulatory 
process. In short, it was too weak to efficiently limit the market power of 
HT even when the regulatory framework was established and the 
liberalisation of the market started.” 
However, relative to other SEE countries, Croatia significantly increased 
the NRAs political independence, while in Serbia, Montenegro and BiH, 
the governments are still highly involved in adopting regulatory decisions 
(Cullen International, 2009). 
Nevertheless, the privatisation of the state-owned monopoly assisted the 
introduction of competition by allowing the entry of new companies to 
the market in a sector that had previously been entirely dominated by the 
state monopoly in all segments of telecommunication services.  
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The Croatian Agency for Telecommunications (HAT) started to operate in 
2004, and in cooperation with the Agency for the Protection of Market 
Competition (AZTN) has introduced market rules and regulation to 
liberalise the market and ensure fair competition for the new entrants in a 
situation of substantial dominance by one player i.e. Croatian Telecom 
(HT). Later on the Agency expanded its area of work to include postal 
activities, and in 2008 it changed its name to the Croatian Post and 
Electronic Communications Agency (HAKOM). In the period from 2004-
2009 many regulatory improvements have been made to ensure 
competition on the market. The number of operators increased not only in 
mobile telephony but also in fixed telephony. Access to infrastructure 
improved for new entrants and the Agency started to take into account 
the satisfaction of consumers through improving the quality of services, 
and to speed up the settling of disputes between providers and users.  
Since its establishment, HAKOM has worked towards synchronisation of 
the Croatian regulatory environment with the acquis communautaire, and 
to comply with regulatory requests stemming from the EU accession 
process. In order to do that, a new Law on Electronic Communications was 
adopted in 2008 (OG 73/08) which defined more precisely the role of 
regulator. 
As a result of HAKOM’s activities, by 2010 the telecommunications market 
in Croatia was successfully aligned with the EU acquis communautaire. The 
EC has praised Croatia’s legislative alignment to EU standards and 
regulatory practice (EC, 2010). 
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Protection of consumers and other effects of the market 
regulation and competition  
The improvements in the protection of consumers and the quality of 
services has been visible since the adoption of the 2008 Law on Electronic 
Communications and the accompanying bylaws which regulate the 
behaviour of the service providers and increase the transparency of prices 
and different tariff packages. Also, regulation increased the transparency 
of consumers’ rights for timely and correct information about the services 
provided. All of this has led to an increase in the general satisfaction of 
consumers and a greater consideration of users’ experience of services by 
providers rather than simply focusing on company profits.  
In the last decade, several measures which are common in mature market 
economies were introduced in Croatia for the first time. For instance, a 24 
hour customer services’ telephone line, an improvement in companies’ 
communication skills with customers, and systemic analyses of consumer’s 
behaviour and their habits, and of customer complaints. Also they 
increased cooperation with associations for consumer protection and 
other institutions whose role is to prevent consumers’ abuse by the 
incumbent operator HT. 
The total number of complaints has increased slightly in the last two years. 
Most complaints are about bills (73% in 2009), while the complaints about 
the quality of services have decreased substantially since 2007, indicating 
that consumers have benefited from an increased quality of services as a 
result of the increased competition between providers. Since its 
establishment HAKOM has invested in capacity building and improving the 
competence of its staff in settling disputes, .  One of the interviewees 
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stressed that: “Even now after so much training there is a lack of 
competent legal experts at the disposal of HAKOM to cope with complex 
dispute cases among service providers with dozens of very well paid and 
excellent lawyers on the HT side”. 
Impact of regulation on prices of services 
For many decades when the provider was under state ownership, inland 
calls on fixed telephone lines in Croatia were heavily subsidised so that 
they could be affordable to lower income groups. On the other hand 
foreign calls and other services such as internet access were usually 
overpriced. The liberalisation of prices and opening of competition have 
brought a more commercial approach to pricing. The regulator has played 
the balancing role between these two goals in order to ensure that 
privatisation does not harm the poorest consumers and has consequently 
provided for a gradual increase in prices. 
HAKOM has succeeded in bringing some order into telecom prices, so that 
they better reflect underlying costs to the benefit of consumers of services 
while also enabling fair competition for new private entrants to the 
market so that they may operate on an equal footing. The existence of 
competition has stimulated price reduction and has thus produced 
benefits for the all consumers.  
Regulation also ensures that relative tariffs are more in balance with the 
underlying relative costs, and investment decisions are not distorted by 
loss making services and the need for cross-subsidy. However, the 
rebalancing of the incumbent operator's retail tariffs is a continuing 
process in all the countries of the region and progress remains slow. So 
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far, only Croatia has approached the EU-27 averages regarding the cost-
oriented charges for monthly line rentals (€14.7 per month) and 3 minute 
local call tariffs (13.8 eurocents) (Cullen International, 2009). In the market 
for local calls, there is still only a small degree of real competition which 
may reflect traditional under-pricing of local calls by the incumbent 
operators which then create barriers for alternative operators (Cullen 
International, 2009). 
Although a cost-based approach is closer to the EU regulatory framework, 
a price cap approach which is easier to use predominates in the SEE 
region. However, new tariff regulatory methodologies are beginning to 
appear, replacing price caps. Croatia has a “price squeeze test” designed 
to ensure that retail prices cover the SMP operator’s own network and 
commercial costs (Cullen International, 2009).  
When benchmarking the prices for various telecom services with the EU-
10 NMS, a recent study for HAKOM (A.R.S. Progetti, 2009) concluded that 
prices for mobile and fixed telephony in Croatia are still high compared to 
the most EU NMS, although the broadband services among the lowest in 
the region16.  
To summarise, the process of privatising incumbent operators in SEE has 
brought about an uneven convergence towards the liberalised prices 
which exist on the EU market. Croatia has come closest to the EU 
liberalised price level, as could be expected since the country is “soon to 
be” an EU member. In terms of the regulatory convergence of telecom, 
according to the EC Croatia Progress Report 2010, Croatia has fully 
completed the transposition of regulatory rules and standard practices. 
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Privatisation of the Oil and Gas Industry: the Case of 
INA 
Croatia started to privatise the oil and gas industry relatively late as 
compared to most advanced transition economies in Central and Eastern 
Europe (CEE) which joined the EU in 2004. For instance, Hungary 
privatised the first 8% of MOL shares in 1993, thus being the first oil and 
gas industry in the CEE to be privatised (Buzady, 2010; Antal-Mokos and 
Toth, 2006). Privatisation in CEE was to a large extent driven by the 
integration process with the EU. In Croatia, such a motivation was mostly 
absent since it stayed outside the mainstream integration process for the 
whole of the 1990s. Later on however, the privatisation of the large public 
enterprises also became vital for the Croatian reform agenda, particularly 
after signing the Stabilisation and Association Agreement with the EU in 
2001 and especially after becoming a candidate country in 2004.  
The possibility of privatising public utilities in Croatia was opened through 
the Privatisation Law (1996) which replaced the previous Law on 
Transformation of Socially Owned Enterprises (1991)17 that had guided 
privatisation transactions in the early period of transition. The 1996 law 
mentioned the privatisation of public utilities (oil and gas company, energy 
production and distribution, rail and road transportation, water and 
forestry management.) for the first time. This had previously been outside 
the process, and they had actually been nationalised due to their strategic 
importance on the basis of governmental decree from 1991 (having 
previously been under ‘social ownership’). The 1996 law acknowledged 
the need for restructuring and privatising these companies.  
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As for the energy sector, after a long period of preparations and 
discussions, the Parliament finally reached agreement on its initial 
privatisation and in April 2002 passed the Law on Privatisation of INA18, 
the state oil and gas monopoly. The Law allowed the sale of the first 25% 
plus one share to strategic foreign investor. The Law on Privatisation of 
HEP19 (energy production and distribution), proposed its sale through an 
initial public offering. Both the laws on the privatisation of INA and HEP 
were prepared with the assistance of Price Waterhouse which was 
selected through an international public tendering process. 
The motivations for privatisation of INA oil and gas 
industry 
For the whole decade of 1990s INA stayed outside the privatisation 
process as the  government of Croatia declared it an enterprise of 
strategic importance for the economy and therefore kept it 100% owned 
by state.20  The privatisation of the oil and gas industry was postponed 
until 2003 and the adoption of INA Privatisation Act (2002). At the time of 
privatisation, INA was by far the most valuable public sector company in 
Croatia and the leading regional petrochemical company. It remained very 
important for the Croatian economy after privatisation, especially in terms 
of its contribution to GDP, employment and generating tax revenue. In 
2008, with EUR 3.8 billion of total sales revenues INA accounted for 9.5% 
of Croatia’s GDP. The total VAT, excises and other taxes that the INA 
Group21 paid in 2009 amounted to 4.6% of total tax revenues. 
The company was however traditionally under the heavy influence of 
politics which influenced the selection of the top management through 
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political appointments, putting the company under the effective control of 
the political elite. Although such a position could indeed offer the 
company a powerful shield, it was not always in the company’s best 
interest, as it was often used as a “cash machine” for government and the 
ruling party, the HDZ. Such a situation in turn affected the privatisation 
plans, which as shown above were much delayed, compared to the CEE 
transition countries. 
The motivation for privatisation was somewhat different at the company 
level and at the level of the government as an owner. At the company 
level, the motivation was fuelled by the need for an intensive commercial 
restructuring of the state-owned company; the need to introduce modern 
corporate governance and improved efficiency, and for new capital 
investments for the technological modernisation of the company. Strong 
competitive pressures came from the Austrian OMV and MOL which had 
started to expand in Croatia, and to acquire stakes in other companies and 
develop production capacities in SEE and neighbouring CEE countries (in 
Slovakia, Slovenia, Romania, as well as in Croatia).  
In the case of INA it was considered that the entry of a strategic partner 
into the ownership structure would not only be profitable for the 
company in the long run, but also for the state budget, both in terms of 
net proceeds from privatisation as well as earnings via dividends, 
notwithstanding the overall gain for the national economy if the company 
were to become more efficient.  
At the  government level, the main push and momentum for privatisation 
of INA was however built by the immediate need for increased Budget 
income as some of the substantial cost items (such as return of debt to 
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pensioners by the rule of Supreme Court22) could not be covered by 
ordinary Budget income and without increasing proceeds from 
privatisation. As elsewhere, both in the mature market economies and 
transition economies, many government s have enthusiastically embraced 
privatisation of large public utilities, mostly because they bring large 
revenues without having to increase taxes. 
The privatisation of INA oil and gas industry: snapshot on 
stages 
The privatisation of INA was implemented in several stages, starting with 
the Law on Privatisation of INA in 2002. Under this legislation 25% plus 
one share23 was to be sold to a strategic partner with 15% of shares was to 
be sold by a public auction at the stock exchange, 7% of the stock was 
assigned for war veterans and members of their families, while an 
additional 7% was to be sold to present and former employees at 
discounted prices.  The Law on Privatisation of INA together with its 
Amendments of 2006 envisaged that the government would decrease its 
ownership stake, retaining only about a 25% plus one share after Croatia 
joins the European Union. The golden share would enable the government 
to veto any major strategic change in the company without its consent.24 
In November 2003, the 25% plus one share was sold to the Hungarian oil 
company MOL for about $505 million.  After a long bidding and selection 
process, MOL was considered as the best strategic partner25 and MOL 
acquired 2.5 million of INA’s shares.. In 2005,a further 7% by value of INA 
shares was transferred to the Croatian war veterans26 and their family 
members without compensation.  
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In July 2005, the Croatian Parliament decided to continue with the 
privatisation of INA and formed a Commission to take care of it. The third 
stage of privatisation started in 2006, with an initial public offer of 15% of 
ordinary INA shares to the Croatian citizens on preferential terms. 
The fourth stage was implemented in 2007 and involved the privatisation 
of a further 7% of INA’s shares to the present and former employees at a 
discount to the nominal price of 1% for each working year. As a result, the 
Croatian government reduced its share below 50%. 
In September 2008, MOL made a takeover offer to acquire additional 
shares of INA, which resulted in the increase of its ownership share in INA 
to 47.16%.27After five privatisation stages, the  government stake was 
reduced to only 44.84% and it thus became only the second largest 
shareholder in the company.  
MOL took operational control over INA in 2009, including the majority of 
the management board members, even though it does not own more than 
50% of the company. This topic has provoked much political debate in 
Croatia as it was perceived that government betrayed national interests by 
transferring INA’s management to MOL without the majority of ownership 
rights. The Parliament even formed a special Parliamentary Commission to 
investigate the privatisation process of INA, after the arrest of Damir 
Polančec, ex - Minister of Economy and Vice-President of the Croatian 
Government. The controversy further escalated after 10 December 2010 
when MOL issued yet another offer for the purchase of yet more shares 
which would lead to its majority ownership.  The government considered 
the latter offer to amount to a hostile takeover bid. It complained that it 
had not been notified about this strategic move by MOL, and announced 
35 
that this situation endangered the mutual strategic partnership of two 
largest shareholders of INA. At the end of January 2011 it was evident that 
MOL’s strategy had failed as it managed to take over only 0.1% of the 
shares to reach a total of 47.26%, while the Croatian pension funds bought 
4.15%. Furthermore, an investment fund originating in Cyprus acquired for 
MOL a further 1.6% of shares, following which on 15th of March 2011 
Croatia's stock market regulator HANFA suspended trade in INA shares in 
order to identify the investors after the share price reached the all-time 
high. It is possible that this unknown private shareholding, together with 
the remaining 2.31% still held by other private investors could be sold to 
MOL, which could thereby reach the 50% plus one share target for 
majority ownership. The situation without a majority owner will be likely 
to continue until Croatia enters the EU, when the government stakes 
might be up for sale again, unless the government decides to introduce 
new legislation to prevent this, as it has recently announced.28 
Selected indicators of the post-privatisation 
business performance  
Revenues 
Although new competitors entered the oil derivatives market prior to 
privatisation, INA continued to exploit its “close to monopoly” position on 
the even after MOL bought 25% of its shares, and its revenues almost 
doubled between 2002 and 2008 (see Figure 6). However, the growth of 
MOL’s revenues was even faster than the growth of INA’s, enabling MOL 
to capture some of INA’s market share.29 
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Figure 6. INA - Net Revenues, 2002-2009 (€ mln) 
 
Source: Annual Financial Reports of INA and MOL, 2002-2009 
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Level of employment and productivity of labour after 
privatisation 
Throughout the post-privatisation period INA has maintained its level of 
employment at around 16,000.  In the autumn of 2010, INA announced a 
plan to restructure and reduce employment by 9%. This is the first plan for 
laying off redundant workers since the company was privatised suggesting 
that privatisation had little influence in that area.  However, it should be 
emphasised this was not a voluntary decision as there was a clause in the 
Privatisation Agreement with MOL according to which INA would not lay 
workers off within a five-year period after privatisation.  
Nevertheless, even without layoffs significant labour productivity gains 
were achieved, with net revenues per employee doubling in 2004-2008, 
from €118,999 to €225,950, dropping only in 2009 to €170,265 per 
employee due to the effects of the global economic crisis. It is notable that 
these productivity gains were not achieved by decreasing the number of 
employees in the company.  
Other privatised oil and gas companies in the SEE did not have such an 
agreement, and they experienced a large reduction in the number of their 
employees (see Figure 7). For example, after Romanian Petrom was 
bought by Austrian OMV, the number of employees was nearly halved 
from an initial 50,010 in 2004 to just 27,470 in 2009. 
Similarly, the OMV Group dramatically reduced the number of employees 
following privatisation by 30% from 2005 to 2009, as a cost reduction 
measure to remain competitive.  Consequently, INA’s labour productivity 
remained significantly below its competitor, OMV. 
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Figure 7. Decrease in number of employed persons, 2004-2009 
 
Source: Companies’ Annual Reports, 2004-2009 
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invested especially in gas production and in exploration projects in the 
North Adriatic together with Italian partners. INA also made significant 
investments in the modernisation of two refineries in Rijeka and Sisak, 
especially in 2008-2009, doubling its investment in long term assets from 
11% of net sales in 2007 to 20.2% in 2009 (See Figure 8). The privatisation 
agreement of 2003 actually obliged MOL to invest $1.5 billion in R&D and 
in the modernisation of Rijeka and Sisak refineries within five years. 
Figure 8. Total investments in the long-term assets (% of net sales), 2005-
2009 
 
Source: INA Annual reports 2005-2009  
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first years after privatisation could be found in the adoption of a “wait and 
see” attitude by both major shareholders until a majority ownership of 
MOL is achieved. An additional reason was the lack of sufficient profits for 
reinvestment, as the price policy of the government was led by the 
“social” prices of gas, which caused INA to suffer losses on this segment of 
the market. Also, between 2008 and 2010 the global financial crisis also 
led to a more cautious approach towards investment in long-term assets. 
Since the intensive capital investments were mostly financed by loans 
rather than by reinvested funds due to the slow growth of net revenues 
and the stagnating value of equity, the investment which was carried out 
led to a worsening of the a net financial position of INA and caused the 
steep surge in the debt/equity ratio. Besides the increased investment 
activities, another reason for this outcome has been a substantial fall of 
profits due to the effect of the controlled prices of natural gas and fuels.  
However, political economy factors provide a more reasonable 
explanation for the increase of INA's debt.  Some of the in-depth 
interviews that we carried out with members of the supervisory and 
executive boards as well as with some independent analysts shed some 
more light on the possible reasons for that. The rate of capital investments 
almost doubled when MOL became the largest shareholder in 2008.  This 
situation opened the doors for MOL to gain majority ownership. 
Consequently, investing in improving production capacities was a sensible 
business decision, and contrasted with the lack of investment when the 
majority ownership was in hands of Croatian government.  
It should be noted that OMV and MOL also experienced a surge in their 
debt to equity ratio in 2009, which was an especially hard year for INA. 
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Earnings, profit rates and investment 
The delayed restructuring and the large investment in production facilities, 
together with the subdued prices of natural gas which were controlled by 
the state , resulted in a worsening of the efficiency indicators especially in 
2008-2009. In 2008, INA’s ratio of earnings to net sales fell to just 7%, 
followed by a significant recovery in 2009. The company went into the red 
with an operating loss in 2008, recovering only slightly in 2009 and more 
significantly in 2010 when it managed to return to profitability30. INA’s 
main competitors also recorded a significant worsening of earnings, 
although the figures remained relatively high (see Figure 9). 
Figure 9. EBITDA of INA compared with selected oil companies in EU 
NMS – MOL (Hungary), Petrom (Romania), Slovnaft (Slovak Republic) 
 
Source: Annual Reports of Mol, INA, Petrom,  Slovnaft, 2004-2009 
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The views on responsibilities for such a situation vary and couple of the 
independent experts interviewed have stressed that: 
    ”INA has entered into a difficult downtrend in business performance 
precisely due to the profound impact of the state administration and 
politics on its top management. By insisting on low gas prices the losses for 
the company were unavoidable. It is unfair to expect a commercial 
company to implement the social policies that should be the responsibility 
of the state and solved by state bodies and instruments”.  
Another interviewee, a former management board member argued that:  
“There is a misconception among the wider Croatian public that the 
responsibility for bad performance lies on the shoulders of INA’s strategic 
partner MOL. On the contrary, the responsibility lies in the Management 
and Supervisory Board members selected by the  government mainly 
through political appointments ,who did not invest enough in the future of 
the company and followed a  “wait and see” logic which considered that it 
would be unwise to reinvest into a company with an uncertain majority 
ownership”. 
Increased competition on the retail market: the impact on 
shares and prices  
While the other segments of the business benefited from the involvement 
of MOL as a strategic partner, INA’s retail services stagnated after 
privatisation. The management board also now acknowledges that the 
retail sector has been neglected and emphasises that more efforts will be 
put into developing this area in the future.31 
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Several interviewees singled out this area as the one where INA lost its 
competitive advantage on the domestic market over the last four to five 
years. The reasons mentioned include a low investment in the retail 
network, a loss of strategic locations of the filling stations as traffic shifted 
towards newly built highways where INA failed to invest enough in 
opening new petrol stations.  
INA has been facing increased competition on the retail market in Croatia, 
especially in the retail of oil derivatives, losing its former exclusive position 
in oil refining, wholesale and retail. Although no new refineries have been 
built in Croatia, the opening to imports and the activities of competitors in 
building new filling stations led to an increased competition in the retail 
sector. While MOL has been rather successful in increasing its position 
throughout the SEE region, measured by the number of filling stations, INA 
has failed to increase its filling stations in Croatia and abroad beyond 
about 500.  
After the privatisation of INA it was expected that MOL's market share of 
the petrol and gas-oil retail market, should have increased in Croatia from 
55% to 65%, with a higher margin for highways stations. The Agency for 
the Protection of Market Competition did not allow that development and 
imposed the sale of Crobenz, an INA subsidiary with 14 petrol stations 
countrywide, while MOL was allowed to retain its subsidiary Tifon, with 40 
petrol stations. In May 2010 the Agency finally approved the sale of 
Crobenz to the Russian company Lukoil. The market share of market 
leader INA has increased from 55.4% to 58.7% (INA and Tifon combined), 
while the share of Lukoil increased from 1.3% to 3.1% by acquiring 
Crobenz from INA (See Figure 10). 
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Figure 10.  Retail market shares (%) by number of petrol stations 
 
Source:  MOL/INA decision, class: UP/I 030-02/2009-02/05 of June 9 2009, Official 
Gazette 113/2009 
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the Board of Directors (finance and corporate services) was not 
proportional to its ownership stake in INA at the time. According to 
widespread public and media perceptions, the initial agreement was 
poorly designed and resulted in a weakening of the government’s 
influence on the operational performance of INA and its business 
development. 
However, one interviewee had quite a different opinion and argued that: 
 “One could speak about the profound impact of the state on the 
management of INA for the whole period until MOL actually became the 
largest shareholder when it actually took the leading role in the 
management board. Since the privatisation of the first instalment of 25% 
plus one share the government continued to manage INA as it actually 
remained a public enterprise.” 
In October 2008, a new contract on the mutual relationship between 
shareholders was signed,  with an Annex to the Contract being signed in 
January 2009, through which MOL gained the right to appoint five out of 
nine of the Supervisory Board members, while the Croatian  government 
appointed only the Chairman of the Supervisory Board, and employees 
appoint one member.  By becoming the largest shareholder, MOL also has 
the right to appoint the President of the Management Board and half of 
the six Management Board members. In the case of a balanced number of 
votes on the Management Board, the casting vote is that of the President 
of the Management Board appointed by MOL. Thus, under the strategic 
partnership contract of January 2009, MOL obtained a dominant influence 
on the business operations of INA. This change made it easier to manage 
the company on a daily basis as reflected in the improved performance 
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indicators for 2009 and 2010.  However, the major source of controversy is 
that the new contract has granted MOL management control over INA 
which does not stem from his ownership rights.  Since there is a suspicion 
that such a deal was made “behind the scene”, this  will continue to 
burden strategic partnership  between two major shareholders and  
perhaps even  lead to some revisions of the partnership contract.   
In analysing the stages through which MOL becoming a leading regional 
multinational company Buzady (2010) and Antal-Mokos and Toth (2006)  
stressed  that MOL’s corporate governance strategy in the acquired 
companies in the region was to build up synergy and common interests 
stressing mutual benefits of partnership and eliminating “we – they” 
attitudes. However, this strategy was not an easy one in INA due to 
absence of a clear ownership majority, and the decision-making process 
was difficult due to the conflicting objectives of the two major 
shareholders. For instance, it was not possible to achieve greater cost-
efficiency and improved retail competitiveness because the government 
would not permit a reduction in the level of employment in the company. 
Also, further liberalisation of the price of gas was introduced only 
gradually as social objectives outweighed the goals of improving business 
performance. However, having two major shareholders without a clear 
ownership majority continued to pose difficulties for the decision making 
process. The “we and they“ divisions in the management and supervisory 
boards still exist in practice as demonstrated by the recent developments 
in December 2010 when MOL made another takeover offer to the small 
shareholders of INA.  
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Regulation, competition and market performance  
In Croatia the regulation of energy activities is implemented by the 
Croatian Energy Regulatory Agency (CERA) which was founded in 2004 as 
an autonomous, independent and non-profit public institution based on 
the Act on the Regulation of Energy Activities32.  CERA is responsible for its 
work to the Croatian Parliament.  Nevertheless, CERA is not fully 
independent in its decisions. While the EU regulatory independence 
principle of separation of the national regulatory authority from the 
regulated firms is fully respected the principle of isolation of the regulator 
from political intervention is not yet fully met at the time of writing, 
although the regulatory framework is in preparation. 
The market of oil products is controlled by the regulator according to a 
defined reference price (Mediterranean CIF – Genoa) and by limiting 
trading margins and additional costs33, the gas sector is more strongly 
influenced by the government interests and its social considerations. Any 
increase of gas prices should be approved not only by CERA but also by the 
Ministry of Economy, indicating that there is not a complete separation of 
powers between the regulator and the government bodies in Croatia.  This 
has led to controlled prices of gas for households and industry. This policy 
has harmed the business performance of INA, as mentioned above. While 
being beneficial for the lowest income population, it also benefited higher 
income households as the prices were not sensitive to incomes.  
As stated by one interviewee: “It does not seem logical that the state 
should subsidise the price of gas for higher income people. Even less logical 
is to provide preferential prices for some industrial enterprises which are 
very profitable and completely privately owned. Even more, what logic 
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could the government have to provide subsidised gas prices to private 
shopping malls or retail chains?” 
Changes in legislation enabled the liberalisation of prices in 2010 for 
industrial and other customers, except for households which still enjoy 
subsidised prices of natural gas.  
The liberalisation of prices of gas is an important task for government 
prior to joining the European Union. So far, a gradual approach has been 
applied in order to avoid steep increase of prices which as a consequence 
would have a negative cascading impact on competitiveness of the 
industry, as well as on individual well-being, especially the poor. In the 
course of 2010 the government prepared the legislative framework for 
strengthening the electricity and gas market by application of the Third 
Energy Package of EU energy legislation34. On the basis of this package, 
CERA would become more independent from government in regulatory 
decision making and in regulating the formation of prices and tariffs of gas 
and oil derivatives for which no final approval by the government would 
be necessary. All the required laws are expected to be adopted in 2011 
which would enable the implementation of the Third Energy Package.35 
The regulation in the energy sector is complemented by the work of the 
Croatian Competition Agency (CCA) which monitors the implementation of 
the principles of the Competition Act (Official Gazette, no.79/09) and 
provides assessments of market concentration in the oil derivatives 
market. The CCA also controls the activities of the company with a 
dominant market position (INA) and identifies relevant markets of 
products36. 
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Conclusions and implications for policy  
Studies carried out over the last twenty years have shown mixed results 
and little consensus about the efficiency gains and social costs of 
privatising public utilities, and debate about it continues. It is difficult to 
isolate the effects of the change of ownership on business performance 
from other important factors such as the impact of regulation and 
competition (Bognetti and Obermann, 2009; Newberry, 2001). However, 
some utilities that are more ”commercial” and “globalised” than others 
and which are extensively driven by advances in technology such as 
telecommunications and the oil and gas industry provide convincing 
evidence that business performance improves after privatisation 
(Broadmann et al, 2004; Kessides, 2004; OECD, 2009; Megginson 2005; 
Nestor, 2005).  
Croatia has many similarities with the new member states of the EU in the 
regulatory framework guiding the privatisation and restructuring of 
companies in the telecommunications and oil and gas industries. Although 
the regulatory framework, institutional arrangements and timing have 
been country-specific, Croatia has followed a similar set of reforms 
converging to the experience of other EU and OECD countries (Sahlin-
Andersson, 2004; OECD 2004; Kessides, 2004). Regardless the fact that 
regulatory harmonisation and the convergence of standards of business 
conduct is an important element of the EU integration process, there was 
a considerable amount of economic reform resistance in Croatia especially 
in the 1990s, but also by later HDZ governments in the 2000s causing 
significant lagging behind the NMS (Bartlett, 2008). 
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The first common feature of the privatisation of the telecommunications 
and the oil and gas industries in Croatia, the SEE and the EU NMS is that 
the process has been performed in a gradual and incremental way, i.e. by 
selling state assets in several tranches or stages. That may be prudent in 
terms of allowing sufficient time for establishing a complex regulatory 
framework to guide competition and price formation. Moreover, partial 
privatisation has enabled the government to benefit from efficiency gains 
without giving up control over the public utilities altogether (OECD, 2009). 
The other reason for privatising in stages is related to the political 
economy of the process. This highlights that the opponents of 
privatisation who resist the idea of selling strategic public enterprises tend 
to more readily accept the piecemeal sale of the “family silver” and 
keeping it under state control for as long as possible. Also, by selling a 
portion of shares to individuals at discounted prices in subsequent stages, 
the government expanded the “constituency in favour” of privatisation as 
widely as possible. 
The other similarity of the telecom and oil and gas privatisations in Croatia 
with the EU has been the presence of a multi-national company (MNC) as 
a foreign investor. In this way the privatised companies were exposed to 
international business experience which assisted them in advancing 
technologically and in comparing their business performance 
internationally (Buzady, 2010; Bognetti and Obermann, 2008). Involving an 
MNC resulted in an easier integration into the international market for 
services and into technology supply chains, as well as enabling access to 
services and products at lower prices and to further investment in 
infrastructure to the benefit of the company, the state and the consumers.  
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The role of effective regulation has been crucial for spreading the welfare 
benefits of the privatisation of public utilities in Croatia and introducing 
competition into the sector. Although, the cost-benefit balance sheet 
seems uneven and differs between different categories of beneficiaries 
(consumers, employees, state, private owners, shareholders and 
stakeholders), the study has shown that corporate efficiency, 
management and accounting practices as well as the transparency of 
business have been substantially improved in both the 
telecommunications industry as well as in the oil and gas industry. This has 
been most significant in the telecommunication sector, as network 
industries are more exposed to global competition which forces them 
towards continuous and sometimes drastic cost-reductions (Maghisan and 
Maghisan, 2008). The example of Croatian Telecom as well as several 
other national telecom operators in SEE fits into this trend. The adoption 
of efficient management mechanisms, enforcement of corporate 
governance codes and rules is a key for the efficiency of privatised 
telecommunications and oil and gas industry in the region. This is 
especially the case where the foreign investor gained majority ownership, 
bringing accumulated expertise and international management practice 
and skills into the company.  
Both telecommunications and the oil and gas industry are highly 
influenced by politics due to their strategic importance, the large number 
of people employed and the huge impact on the input costs of other 
economic sectors. The post-privatisation performance of Croatian 
Telecom, which has a majority foreign owner, has seen the effective 
removal of political influence on their top management. In contrast, INA, 
which retained a large state holding after privatisation did not manage to 
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make a clear break from pressures exerted by the political elite such as 
having members of political nomenclature in the supervisory and 
management boards, and the direct impact on formation of prices through 
various modes of final government approval. It is a good example of a 
company that was traditionally under strong political influence with 
management and supervisory boards being political appointees. In 
addition, company assets were used as a “cash machine” by different 
political interests that were labelled as “strategic national” interests. After 
MOL gained an operational majority of the management board in 2009, 
the direct impact of politics on the everyday business operation of 
company decreased. However, the indirect presence and control of the 
state over the business performance of sector continues through the 
process of price formation and the regulation of competition. 
The financial performance indicators reveal significant improvements in 
the privatised Croatian utilities, but more in telecoms than in oil and gas 
industry, in terms of (i) better quality, diversity and coverage of services, 
(ii) improved efficiency of business performance, (iii) better corporate 
governance and cost-efficiency management, (iv) improved capital 
investments, (v) increased productivity of labour and capital, and (vi) 
protection of customers from market abuse. Some of these improvements 
have been backed up by insights from the interviews with key informants. 
These findings correspond to similar experiences of privatised public 
utilities around the world (OECD, 2009; Kessides, 2004; Megginsson, 2005) 
and in the EU’s new member states such as Hungary, Slovakia or Romania 
(Kalotay, 2010; Buzady, 2010).  
When contextualising the performance of Croatian Telecom and INA in 
terms of wider welfare implications we have focused on employment 
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levels and consumers’ welfare. The efficiency gains in both privatised 
utilities as measured by labour productivity have been significant. 
However, the efficiency gains in HT were achieved mainly through labour 
shedding, with the dismissal of over 45% of employees following 
privatisation. Similar measures were taken in Hungarian Telekom 
(MATAV), Czesky Telekom, and Romtelecom. This represents a significant 
social cost of privatising the national telecom operator, despite the fact 
that it was over-staffed in the pre-privatisation period. A similar situation 
could be found across the EU new members states which also improved 
labour productivity by reducing the number of employees. As for the INA 
oil and gas industry, compared to the region, cost-savings have not been 
achieved at the expense of the employees, and thus the social costs of 
privatisation were not as profound as elsewhere in the region especially in 
Romania and Bulgaria. 
The consumer benefits of increased competition in telecommunications in 
Croatia have mainly been achieved through lower prices of fixed and 
mobile telephony and internet access, through the diversification of 
services in terms of various tariff packages, as well as through an improved 
quality of services. In the oil and gas industry however, privatisation led to 
a liberalisation of prices and to a general increase of oil derivatives prices 
and other products as these were previously under-priced. However, due 
to strict regulation and generous subsidies from state, the increase of gas 
prices both for private consumers and industry was slow and limited and 
did not impose a major shock to consumers. 
The protection of consumers improved in both the privatised 
telecommunications and oil and gas industry in comparison to EU 
standards (Cullen International, 2009). This was primarily due to the 
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regulation of prices based on a standard cost calculation which prevented 
the dominant company from abusing its position on the market. The 
protection of consumers also increased due to the active involvement of 
the telecommunications regulators (i.e. national regulatory authorities) in 
tackling and solving the complaints of consumers and competitors. Croatia 
has now fully converged and transposed its legislation, standards and 
regulatory rules and practices to the acquis communautaire. As for the oil 
and gas industry, the adoption of the third package of the EU energy 
directives, which will further liberalise the prices in this sector, is to be 
implemented in 2011. This will significantly reduce the direct involvement 
of government in approving tariffs and prices which will be left entirely to 
the energy sector regulator CERA. 
The findings of this study suggest that political economy factors have had 
a significant impact on the economic and welfare gains and pains from 
privatization of the public utilities in Croatia for the different beneficiaries. 
The two privatized Croatian utility companies illustrate the basic dilemma 
whether the provision of public goods and services within regulated 
markets should be left to dominant private companies motivated by 
business interests or whether the state as owner is a better protector of 
the “public interest” even though it is often difficult to separate its 
benevolent features from a tendency towards direct political interference 
and the appetites of the ruling elites. The influence of politics has been 
more profound in the case of partly privatized INA, whose ownership 
jigsaw is still very much a work in progress, than in the case of HT which 
was truly privatized with a majority foreign owner, and from which the 
state completely exited the ownership structure. INA is virtually torn 
between the opposing interests of the two largest shareholders (MOL and 
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government) with different agendas and whose performance swings 
between satisfying-often conflicting-commercial efficiency and political 
interests. The situation might change after the accession of Croatia to the 
EU in 2013, when the government stakes might be for sale once again and 
be reduced to just a single “golden share”. The other option of altering the 
privatization legislation so as to block the foreign investor from obtaining 
majority ownership would bring more pain than gain, as it would 
undermine the legitimacy of the legislative framework for investments in 
Croatia. For the benefit of business performance of the company, 
employees, and consumers, it would be wiser to solve conflicting interests 
over the operating control of the company through agreement rather than 
by open conflict between the two “strategic partners”. But it remains to 
be seen if politics will swing the pendulum in another direction. 
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Notes 
 
1. Many studies have rehearsed the arguments for and against 
privatisation of public utilities including Nestor (2005), Nellis (2002), Galal 
et al. (1994), Hall (1997), Wallsten (2002), Wood (2004), Newberry (2001), 
Megginson (2005), Kessides (2004) and  Bognetti and Obermann (2009). 
2. The value of privatisation transactions in 2000-2007 in the public 
utilities and network industries in OECD countries are estimated at close 
to US$ 487 billion, scaling down only during the financial and economic 
crisis. The largest share relate to countries such as France, Italy and 
Germany with a traditional dominance of state ownership in the public 
sectors. 
3. Overviews of experiences of privatisation over the last 15 years have 
been provided by World Bank (2004), EBRD (2004), OECD (2009), 
Megginson (2005), Megginson and Netter (2001), Djankov and Pohl 
(1998), and Wallsten (2002). 
4. In practice, the separation of the ownership and regulatory functions is 
far from perfect and often the interests of competitors, consumers and 
minority shareholders in the partly privatized entity may be endangered, 
especially in the early stages of privatisation (OECD, 2009). The solution is 
to set up an independent regulator to ensure that the regulatory functions 
do not lean towards ownership interests of the state. 
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5. Preserving employment levels in large state owned companies is a 
politically sensitive issue and has been an important non-economic 
objective for the state as an owner. 
6. For comparison, most of the advanced transition economies in Central 
Europe had started to privatise their large public companies in the first 
half of 1990s. 
7. The formal announcement was posted  at the Zagreb Stock Exchange on 
2 December 2010  
8. Pursuant to the Act on the Privatisation of Croatian Telecom (Official 
Gazette 65/1999) 
9. In accordance to modifications of the Croatian Telecom Privatisation Act 
adopted in 2001 (Official Gazette No. 68/01. 
10. This IPO took place on the London and Zagreb Stock Exchange 
11. The equity value was around €115 million. 
12. The immediate motivation for the transfer of shares was the 
government’s liability for the second instalment of debt to be paid to the 
pensioners. 
13. Deutsche Telekom is also a dominant owner of telecommunications in 
Hungary, Slovakia, Montenegro, Macedonia, and Slovenia. This choice of 
strategic investor enabled Hrvatski Telekom to integrate into both the EU 
and regional SEE market at lower prices. 
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14. Telephone number portability while switching to another operator is a 
considered to be a key issue in the development of network competition 
by regulators throughout the world including the EU. 
15. The earnings ratio is calculated as the ratio of EBITDA/revenues where 
EBITDA is Earnings before Interest, Taxes, Depreciation and Amortization 
and EBIT is Earnings before Interest and Tax. These are commonly used 
indicators of the operating profit and cash flow of a company.  
16. A similar position is found in a recent analysis of the World Economic 
Forum, published in the Global Information Technology Report 2010/2011 
which is based on data collected by the International Telecommunications 
Union (ITU). In this report, Croatia ranked relatively poorly in the level of 
prices for telecom service prices and was only ranked favourably for 
broadband Internet monthly charges (33rd out of 134 countries). 
17. Zakon o pretvorbi drustvenih poduzeca, Official Gazette, 19/91, April 
1991. 
18. Zakon o privatizaciji INA – industrijanafted.d. Official Gazette, No. 32, 
2002. 
19. Zakon o privatizaciji Hrvatske elektroprivreded.d. (HEP), Official 
Gazette, No. 32, 2002 
20. INA became a joint stock company in full state ownership in 1993 
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21. Calculated by the authors on the basis of data from INA Annual Report 
2009  
22. This debt was accumulated during the 1991-1995 war in Croatia as the 
government reduced the paid out pensions in order to finance the defence 
of the country. Later on after the rule of the Supreme Court in 1998 the 
debt was fully acknowledged and it was agreed that this should be 
returned to the pensioners in several tranches.  
23. The reason behind this formula (stipulated by clause 4 of The Law on 
Privatisation of INA, 2002) is a wish to attract the foreign investor and 
enable its guaranteed direct impact on management of the company. 
24. The veto concept in the Law on Privatisation of INA has followed 
similar solutions of retaining government interests in privatised oil and gas 
industry including the Privatisation Act of MOL in 1993. See Antal-Mokos 
and Toth (2006) 
25. MOL outbid the Austrian OMV and ten other competitors including 
Russian bidders, thus confirming its plans for regional expansion and 
becoming a leading regional player in the petrochemical industry 
26. The ownership entitlements were individual but later on Veteran Fund 
was formed in order to better represent and take care of their ownership 
interests. 
27. MOL has invested in total $1,167 million in INA, according to Sass et al. 
(2010)  
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28. This option was announced recently in an attempt by the government 
to block MOL from acquiring the majority ownership of INA. If carried out 
it would undermine the legitimacy of the legislative framework for 
investments in Croatia and would most likely bring more harm than 
benefits in the long run.  
29. In 2002 the net revenue of MOL was 2.5 times larger than INA, and the 
ratio grew to 3.75 times by 2009. 
30. According to  unaudited and consolidated 2010 Financial Report INA 
reported a net profit of US$283 million 
31. As stated in “INA in 2009”, by Bojan Milkovic, CEO of INA in a 
statement issued in 2010. 
32. See the Official Gazette, 177/04 and 76/07. 
33. Namely, a difference between the buying and selling prices. 
34. 2010 Pre-Accession Economic Programme, Government of Republic of 
Croatia, January 2011. 
35. The Third energy package was adopted by the European Parliament 
and the Council on 13 July 2009. It stipulates further liberalisation of the 
gas and electricity market, and strives to establish common rules for the 
internal market in electricity; common conditions for access to the 
network for cross-border exchanges in electricity; establishing an Agency 
for the Cooperation of Energy Regulators; common rules for the internal 
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market in natural gas and regulated conditions for access to the natural 
gas transmission networks.   The key features of this legislative package 
will take legal effect between 2011 and 2013, as the member states have 
18 months for transposition of this legislative package into their national 
legislation.  
36. “Relevant markets” is a regulatory term which identifies and combines 
the most relevant product/service markets  and geographic markets that 
are serving as orientation for  prices  for oil and gas products in Croatia.  
See European Commission, 
http://eur-ex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do? 
uri=CELEX:31997Y1209(01):EN:NOT). 
 
 
